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I would like to address the nature of transgression and its 
logic or itinerary in Sade's work. If this task is somewhat 
speculative and incomplete, it perhaps mirrors the foundational 
incompleteness of the more than sixteen extant volumes of 
Sade's writings. For a more exhaustive, if not definitive, 
resolution of the very issue of transgression, the analysis 
would have to continue the debate between Derrida and 
Foucault over the validity of Bataille's celebrated account of 
transgression, which in turn draws upon the earlier work of 
Roger Caillois. 1 
The first concern, however, is to try to ascertain to what 
extent 'transgression' is really a concept in the strict sense. 
While it can assume a variety of grammatical forms (noun, 
transitive or intransitive verb, adjective or adverbial form), the 
noun derives ultimately from the Latin verb transgredi, which 
means, to step (trans) across (gred1). In its transitive verbal form, 
the OED defines 'to transgress' as follows: 'To go beyond the 
bounds or limits prescribed by a law, command etc'. Or, to 
break, violate, infringe, contravene, trespass against'. To this, it 
adds: 'To offend against (a person); to disobey. To go or to pass 
beyond (any limit or bounds)'. In its noun form, the citation 
continues: 'The action of transgressing or passing beyond 
the bounds of legality or right: a violation of law, duty or 
command; disobedience, trespass, sin'. 'The action of passing 
over or beyond (in the etymological sense)'. Or, 'The refusal 
to be limited'. More conventionally, perhaps, transgression is 
held to be synonymous with the following: trespass, violation, 
infraction, breach, infringement, contravention. Further, it is 
held to be analogous with such terms as encroachment, 
invasion, entrenchment, slip, lapse, offense, sin, vice, crime. 
It immediately becomes evident that 'transgression' is no 
ordinary word. It seems to represent what Leibniz would call a 
musterrol/e of characterisations or qualities: for example, a 
veritable roster or calendar of types and specimens. The 
examples or instances of its use-- simply as enumerated 
in the OED entry-- concern or deal with the following 
abstract cases: bounds, limits, prescriptions, laws, commands, 
conventions, duties, statutes, constitutions, doctrines, goals, 
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paths, boundaries, proportions, sequence or formations. The 
general subject matter to what these cases or concerns would 
refer, are the following-- again, from one dictionary citation: 
property, civil law. constitutional law, ecclesiastical or cannon 
law, human will. Divine will, the human subject, human 
conduct, geology, music and manners. This abstract and 
general range alone, would provide a dizzying basis for a 
classification of transgression. And add to this a discussion of  
precisely what nature, conduct or humanity alone might entail. 
and the most astute numerologist or taxonomist would quickly 
be left speechless. Again, in its most succinct lexical formation: 
to transgress is to pass beyond any limit, any boundary. And 
what is defined by a limit? a boundary? Precisely that which 
has discrete form, discrete identity. 
We seem hard pressed, then, to speak about transgression 
in any precise sense. What, for example, would constitute a 
strategy for finding examples of transgression? That is, how 
would we identify transgression. or acts of transgression, in 
the first place? This task would surely raise the problem of 
the hermeneutic circle: we would have to presuppose a 
rather definite concept of transgression in order to discern its 
particular instances. Quite simply, one would have to know, 
one would have to presuppose, the nature of what one is 
looking for. prior to being able to identify something as an 
example of it. Alternatively, is transgression perhaps something 
other than a concept in the strict sense-- is it perhaps a vague 
notion? An idea, disposition, or state, which assumes identity 
only in name. only nominally? Would this nominal unity therefore 
be established on the basis of gathering various features of 
resemblance? Thus, the nominal unity of the term would find its 
basis in metaphorical usage, or in a certain figurative use of 
speech (for example, by turning to the analogy or simile). 
Would there be a family resemblance of features? Perhaps a 
general metaphorical or morphological sameness to the varied 
uses of what passes for transgression? 
One striking feature of this term. this so-called concept of 
transgression. is that in each pretended case of its use, it seems 
to acquire sense from the object of its operation. Thus. I 
transgress something or someone. If I transgress the law, I am a 
law-breaker. If I transgress divine command, I am a sinner. If I 
transgress one's person, I am perhaps an assailant or a rapist. 
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Do that to another's property and one is a trespasser;. to 
another's ownership of property, and one is thereby a thief. 
Those who transgress codes of  social conduct are termed 
barbarians or churls; civil conduct, criminals. Transgress proper 
etiquette or manners and one is a boor. Do that to statistically 
conventional behaviour, and one is usually deemed insane. 
I f  transgression were to be operated upon conventional 
speech, discourse itself would become incomprehensible: it 
would risk grammatical unintelligibility. The transgression of 
conventional sexual conduct or identity constitutes deviance or 
perversion, as would the transgression of .ethical codes 
constitute immorality. 
Now, surely, these terms carry a negative import, even if, to 
be most generous, this might only amount to a rhetorical 
indictment. The question of negativity, however, arises in at 
least two senses: 1) Negativity arises in the attitude that we 
assume in the face of such transgressions as rape, insanity, 
theft, boorishness, etc. In this case, it is a matter of our 
judging certain transgressive acts negatively. Yet-- fo llowing for 
a moment the nominal sense of transgression-- would there 
not equally be transgressive acts we might well consider in 
positive terms, acts which we would most likely lend our 
approval? Perhaps there are 'good' or estimable types of 
transgression: indeed, to transgress the limits of  the status quo, 
understood as progress? For example, technological, economic 
or political progress? Perhaps liberation from institutional forms 
of repression, such as racism, sexism, economic _or political 
bondage? Liberation from institutions of  repression-- taxes, 
titles, penal incarceration. the madhouse or even educational 
tracking, for instance. Freedom. in this case, would signify 
release from a variety of binds. restrictions, codes, norms. etc, 
that were not felt by the individual or by the society to be in his 
or its best interests. And transgression in this positive attitudinal 
sense thus raises the second question concerning negativity. 
Secondly, each case of transgression seems, as we said, to 
be governed by its object. What the sense or meaning o f  each 
transgressive act is seems to come from without. from a limiting 
exteriority. 2 Here, the very operation of transgression seems to 
encounter, precisely, its limit. In  what case, transgression-- it 
might be argued-- is its own limiting case. That is, transgression 
would seem to be the negativity which governs the field of 
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possible operation itself·- whether this field be ethics, morality, 
sexuality, religion, civil law etc. 
It would appear that this sense-- transgression as 
negativity-- would probably be .the principal consideration for 
our everyday use of the term. At least, that is what would seem 
to be the case. In other words, transgression seems to stand or 
fall on its association or identification with one or another kind 
of negation. But, and this is precisely what is at issue. is this 
negative or negating function simply coextensive with the 
already existing field of operation? Does the limit of the 
operational field dictate the range and extent of negativity, or, 
does negativity dictate the limit of the operational field? 
If what is at stake in the notion/idea/ or concept of 
transgression is simply the play of negation or advantage in 
attempting to pursue it-- for it could be understood merely as 
rejection, denial, violation or negation-- then one would 
simply be immoral, irrational, unbalanced, unthinking, 
illogical, unhealthy, noncooperative, insincere, immodest, 
unconventional and illegal. Or, a sinner, deviant and coward. In 
such cases, negativity would be inscribed within its field and by 
its field as surely as the function of denial, invalidity and 
contradiction would be found only within a system of logic: as 
subduction and negation are within mathematics, as ellipsis 
and negation lie within conventional grammar. In short. 
transgression would operate as a system-bound rule of 
operation or deviation. And again, it would be the limit case of 
its own field. 
What would the positively construed attitude have to say 
about the second kind of negation: for example, the limit 
case? Ideally, both the negative and the affirmative kinds 
of transgression could occur within the field of operation: 
progress, reform or development as affirmative modes need not 
leave the region of play or operational engagement. New 
acts might be developments or refinements of earlier types: 
innovative social or political developments would thereby still 
remain under the domain of societal or civil codes. In such a 
sphere, emotional or sexual differences, for example, might not 
only be tolerated, but might well be accommodated to existing 
structures of social and cultural organisation. 
135 
David Allison 
Affirmatively transgressive acts would be little different from 
reformist gestures in this case. The limits which define positive 
and negative operations would remain basically unchanged-­
or, at mbst-- somewhat expanded ciccording to an already 
inscribed pattern or code of systematic organisation. In this 
sense, the difference between heresy and heterodoxy might 
amount to little more than such reforms as those proposed by 
Martin Luther: for example, a protest-ant re-formation. 
Following this line of thought, it might appear that 
transgression-- in either its negative or affirmative modes-­
nonetheless remains bound by its limits, since the limits. which 
in each particular case are addressed, are themselves 
circumscribed by the very field which defines them. In the 
simplest terms, negativity is bound by the values positive and 
negative, and by the respective region or field of application. 
Thus, a positive transgression nonetheless invokes the field in 
which it operates. And, this is precisely why a rapist is a term of 
moral reprobation, or 'atheist' a term of religious reprobation, 
or ·schizophrenia' a term for the mentally maladjusted or 
dis-functional. Hard it is to escape the field of negativity, 
precisely because negativity-- whatever we may think of it-- is 
one of the structures of the field. 
So far, then, we seem to hesitate to assign a positive 
conceptual value, some value or mark of content, to the 
seemingly ampliative character of transgression. Rather, we 
have been speaking of it as a notion, perhaps, one that had to 
be discerned across a variety of cases. The word seems to 
derive its sense from the object and field of the so-called 
'transgressive' operation. Further, we have been discussing, 
without really settling, the issue as to whether ·transgression' is 
in fact system-dependent: for example, whether transgression is 
simply bound by the rules which govern a field of operation-­
even if it be simply to negate or to violate these rules 
themselves, these taboos and prohibitions. Or, should we ask, 
as 'ampliative·, does transgression reinscribe these rules of 
governance and limit within a wider field of play, or, finally, 
whether it suspends the rules themselves by which the field of 
play is properly identified and denominated. Which is to say, 
there seem to be three possible options to our understanding of 
transgression so far: l) that it is system and function-bound. 2) 
That it is system and function-expanding, for example, that it is 
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'ampliative'. 3) That by its operation, system and function are 
themselves fundamentally altered, volatilized: disrupted and 
essentially changed. 
Alternatively, and more modestly, perhaps, these three 
ways of viewing transgression might simply point up that we 
have but barely sketched out the domain of a discourse, 
without assigning a very precise sense to the terms of that 
discourse. To come to the point of decision, we would 
ultimately have to examine instances or cases of what passes 
for transgression. We would have to examine various discourses 
about transgression, and raise the issue as to whether or not it 
can called a concept, a notion or a sense-unity at all, and 
finally, to try to point out within which context it makes sense 
even to talk about transgression either about a specific case 
of transgression, or about transgression in general. If the 
latter, what is the compass, the arena, the deployment of 
transgression? What does it include or exclude as its multifarious 
operation? Might general transgression include, within its own 
reservoir of possibility and operation, the formal identity of the 
language we use to denominate it? In which case, can it-- to 
call it 'it'-- be spoken about, written about, enunciated, 
recorded or even remembered? Recall our itinerary. 
More commonly, perhaps, we tend to think of transgression 
as being motivated, as having some purpose for its initial 
operation-- commonly, I say, if we think of the usual, lexically 
defined instance of this word. 'Little Francine was raped by 
someone' -- there must be a reason! 'Young Herbert outraged 
the entire community by his unspeakable acts'-- why would 
such a nice boy do that? Motivation and purpose: these seem 
to characterize what passes by the name 'transgression' 
in almost every possible case, whether we initially view 
transgressive acts as negative or as positive testaments. 
Perhaps the most positive sense of transgression could be 
expressed in the rather sympathetic terms of liberation or 
freedom. To free oneself from fetters of one kind or another, to 
overcome an undesirable condition, brought about by external 
powers, to liberate oneself from, perhaps, an unjust fate. Of 
course, it will be under the rhetoric of just such cases that we are 
wont to ascribe heroism, courage and tragedy to the human 
situation. We know that for the mythology of Hesiod and Homer, 
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the fates guarded the portals of eternity, weaving out their web of 
constraint, governance and ultimately, of subjugation-- the 
subjugation of humanity and even of the Gods as well. Fate or 
fortune-- the words are identical-- govern our affairs. One knows 
this familiar lament all too well. It is that in the face of which one is 
powerless. It is our condemnation. Nonetheless, it occasionally 
smiles on the hero, on the tragic hero, or, even on the person who 
presumes to unravet its divine fabric. 
By the period of the Italian Renaissance and, following that, 
the European Enlightenment, however, that fabric had become 
somewhat threadbare. Galileo, Copernicus, Bacon, Hobbes and 
Machiavelli were the first to more accurately divine the pattern 
to this web: it was relatively consistent in warp and weave, it 
employed the primary colors, and it operated according to the 
inexorable order of mathematical exactitude. It only remained to 
fully assess the myriad details, the rules, the complex web of 
causal affinities in order to understand the very operations of fate: 
but by the period of the Enlightenment, fate or fortune-- what 
Machiavelli termed 'sweet mistress fortuna'-- was itself held to be 
coextensive with the entire natural order. 
We are familiar enough with this historical period of thought to 
recognise it as exemplary of the modern age, having brought us 
the teaching of the mathematical mastery over nature. But, why, 
one asks, should one master nature? Machiavelli responds: 'Such 
that we may make provisions to ensure our own well-being in the 
face of its cruel and intemperate demands'. Descartes, likewise, 
responds: 'Such that I may enjoy all the sweetness and felicity this 
world has to offer'-- and not, one might add, to be crushed by it. 
We should remember that, for Descartes, the highest branch on 
the celebrated 'tree of knowledge', is morality. And what, for 
Descartes, is morality? He defines it, quite simply, as 'the art of 
living well'. 
The motivation for mastering nature would thus appear to 
be transparently obvious. I ts means, perhaps less so. Ultimately, 
it is by something entirely unnatural, that one conquers nature, 
that we can become 'the masters and possessors of nature'. 
This unnatural means of overcoming nature is art: that is to 
say, artifice, technique. For Descartes, this will be the art of 
reasoning well, that is, by fo llowing a non-natural method, 
guided by the rules of mathematics. His two earliest works 
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constitute this claim: the Regu/ae and the Discourse on Method 
argue that analytical geometry is fully adequate to describe 
and to explain the whole of physics, mechanics and dynamics-­
for example, the entire natural order: fate. 
Inhabiting the age of Descartes-- as we well do-- this is 
barely an issue for us. Quite simply, we believe it. We are 
the masters and possessors of nature. In somewhat · more 
contemporary terms, it is frequently heard said that, 'we want it 
all and we want it now'. Even better, perhaps, 'we expect it all 
and we expect it now'. From the situation we occupy, then, 
three teachings of Descartes have been passed down to us, 
and precisely, constitute our age as our age- and we with it: 
l) That we determine the ends and purposes of nature by our 
own will. That is, we become the source of value for the world-­
no longer is it attributed to the dreary fates or to the God of 
the Levant. Our human will dictates the value importance of 
anything in the world. 
2) We accept it as a fact, as a very condition for our modern 
existence, that our human knowledge interprets the world 
according to the pattern we have selected-- in our case, 
mathematics. 
3) What follows, in consequence, is the fact that nature itself 
becomes something quite different for our age-- quite different 
from the conception of nature, prior to the Enlightenment. 
Nature itself, nature in itself, is no longer held to possess value, 
meaning or purpose-- except for, apart from, that value, 
purpose and meaning with which we humans have chosen to 
invest ,it. All this follows from Descartes: as the earth replaced 
the sun for Copernicus, so does the human replace God for our 
modern age. 
When the Marquis de Sade writes, some 150 years later, 
however, he shows that the new teachings of the Renaissance 
and Enlightenment still remain incomplete in their extension, for 
they are, strictly speaking, limited to the precise domain of the 
natural sciences. If human will replaced the divine order, this 
was only effective, it seemed, on the level of scientific theory- -
this, even despite the benefit of an ever-increasing number 
of practical inventions and applications (for example, as 
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catalogued in Diderot's Encyclopedia) . What Sade saw 
practiced, however, was the very opposite o f  a newborn and 
unfettered human freedom. Rather, Sade shows how the 
ancient religious and moral teachings, together with their 
restrictions, their taboos and prohibitions, etc. -- Sade shows 
how the ancient moral teachings continued to forbid the 
effective practice, the effective reawakening o f  human 
freedom. If God was no longer in control of physics and 
dynamics, he seemed, nonetheless, to continue to control the 
minds and bodies of  humanity in general. 'The light of  stars 
takes years . .  . '  
Sade's task, then, is to dramatically finish the work of 
Descartes: to complete the work of the Renaissance and 
Enlightenment thinkers, and to bring the doctrine of  absolute 
mostery and freedom down from the level of theoretical physics 
and dynamics, to the practical level of daily life. Namely, down 
to the level o f  the individual's freedom: so as to permit the 
individual to act as she or he chooses. Thus, Sade claims to 
engage the doctrines of the new sciences so as to bring about 
their concrete expression on the level of ethics and morality. In 
short, he is concerned to understand and to explain how it is 
we act. At the very height o f  the Enlightenment, Sade draws 
his conclusions for the forthcoming secular age: a hundred 
years before Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche. Sade, like Raskolnikov, 
declares: 'If God is dead, then everything is permitted'. For the 
individual, or for humanity at large, for that matter, there is no 
rule, no law, that is absolutely justified or  universally justifiable.3 
Nothing from without can legitimately restrict our freedom to 
act, nothing can properly be said to determine how or why 
we should act, other than our own will, our passions and 
inclinations. In  fact, for the modern political state, freedom 
itself is the beginning and end of  human action: life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness, whatever the latter might consist. 
We recall that in the High Middle Ages, the authority for the 
religious and political administration of Europe, was St. Thomas 
Aquinas. In the Summa Theologica he writes: 
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( . . .  ) Law is a rule an d the measure of acts, whereby man is 
induced to act or is restrained from actin g: for law (lex) is 
derived from the term 'to bind' (ligare) , because it bin ds one 
to act or n ot to act.4 
This was a sent iment about which Sade felt quite strongly. 
Un derstan dably so, since he was bound in p rison for some 
twenty- seven years of his life. Lik ewise, it is un derst andable that 
he wrote in defen ce of p ersonal freedom, an d t hat he n ot only 
attacked the notion of confinement, restriction, an d constraint, 
but that he att ack ed t he institution of law it self. F or every law 
claims submission of t he individual. The human subject is 
p recisely, thereby, that which is subjected. 
In view of his heritage, and in consequen ce of his own 
subjection, Sade is p erhap s the single most uncompromising 
revolutionary in the tradit ion of Western thou ght: he attack s, he 
lay' s siege to, the D ivine L aw, to the Eternal Law, to the Natural 
Law, and to the H uman Law. It is for this reason that Sade is not 
the p altry libertarian , who only wants to negotiate free p assage 
in and among the necessary rules of order, con vention, and 
social j ust ice. Rather, he i s  a libertine:  t he only value consists, 
ultimately, in his p ersonal exercise of freedom-- from any 
an d all con straints, limits, bon ds. Thus, his highest act is the 
total destruction, the tot al ann ihilat ion , of these constraints 
themselves, these laws, rules and duties that bind, that rest rict 
and con strict his personal freedom. 
Sade is no longer content to live comfortably un der t he 
domin ion of order. for order itself constrains an d dictates on ly 
certain p ossibilit ies of p ersonal act ion . Order itself crushes-- it 
deforms or reforms its 'other' -- in its ceaseless demand for 
conformity, assimilation an d submission . Sade' s writ ings about 
transgression or revolution , are thus statements in t he strongest 
sense,. t hey are ' doctrines' in extremis: they deman d the 
comp lete overt hrow of any vestige of order. H is revolt 
or transgression tak es p lace, in each case. accordin g to 
the p articular typ e  of restrict ion that i s  imp osed on his 
freedom, Thus, Sade variously p roposes blasp hemy, immorality, 
crime, incest , murder, violation , lies, slan der, theft,  rapacity, 
irrationality, sodomy, hate and every other k ind of violence, 
p erversion or aberration con ceivable-- each of these a sp ecific 
and considered tactical op erat ion to serve t he strategic 
mo vement of the libert ine's  transgressive iti nerary. 
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Now, all this is n ot to suggest that we cannot profit from a 
con sideration of Sade. On the contrary, h is peculiar style of 
excess teaches us a great deal about the tenor of modern l ife 
an d th ought. Like m an y  strictly contem porary thin ke rs, Sade 
teaches the doctrine of in dividual freedom :  and for h im -- that is 
to say, properly speakin g. for the libertine- - this mean s  absolute 
freedom or liberty: absolved from all const rain t. Somewhat 
differently, perhaps, this is the m odern foun dational doctrine of 
m astery itse lf: the m astery formerly possessed by fortuna, God 
or Nature. But n ow, with Sade, this drive to m astery assumes a 
m ost deliberate progression. One does n ot .  for in stan ce, start 
off as a m aster. For Sade,  we can poin t out at least eigh t stages 
in th is progression t o  absolute m astery, to absolute freedom, 
eight stages of transgression , or. e ight tran sgre ssive operations-­
each of which m ay be con ceived as a pmticular art or 
teachin g. 
1 ) . First, an d as a prelimin ary step. the libe rtine m ust e stablish 
power ove r  h imself. Mastery begin s with the art of se lf-m astery. 
The libe rtine m ust first free h im self from h is o wn weaknesses-- he 
must overcome h is own weak sentimen ts-- sentiments which 
would preven t the growth an d consolidation of h is own power. 
Thus, the libe rtine m ust start off with what is closest to h imself, 
with wh at is already with in h imself, n amely, with h is apparently 
sin gular emotion s-- h is sentimen tal values, or, what Sade refers 
to as the ' alleged in stin cts' . To gain self- cont rol. self-maste r1y, 
h� has rid h im self of the alleged or so- called 'natural in st in cts' , 
such as the instin cts or sentiments of patern ity, m aternity, fami ly 
devotion . filial love etc. Wh at seem to be the in stinctual 
em otion s of n atural life must first be overcome, because they 
would only serve to re str ict the libertine' s d rive to m aste ry; they 
would place limits on the expression of h is own passion s, h is real 
in stincts. urges, wills, energies an d freedom. 
Not on ly does Sade den oun ce the in stin ct for domestic 
family life , but he proposes to replace fam ily life itself with 
incest. Marriage, for the libertine, is termed the ' h ymeneal 
bon d' ,  an d it is ce rtain ly not the product of any re al love 
or affection-- emotions or sentiments which , in any case. 
would serve to weaken or to deflect the libe rtines' s own drive 
to m aste ry. Sade h as one of h is characte rs, Dolm an ce, in 
Philosophy in the Bedroom, m ake followin g rem ark: 
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What is it we see? Reciprocal hatred; children who,  even 
before reaching the age of reason, have never been able 
to suffer the sight of their fathers; fathers sending away their 
children because they could never endure their approach. 
Those alleged instincts are hence fictions , absurd; 
self-interest only invents them, usage prescribes, habit 
sustains, but never did Nature engrave them in our hearts. 
Tell me: do animals know these feelings? No , surely not; 
however, 'tis always them one must consult when one 
wishes to be acquainted with nature. 0 Fathers! Have no 
qualms regarding the so-called injustices your passions or 
your interest leads you to work upon these beings, for you 
nonexistent, to which a few drops of your sperm has given 
life. To them you own nothing, you are in the world not for 
them but for yourselves; great fools you would be to be 
troubled about, to be occupied with anything but yourself; 
for yourselves alone you ought to live. And you,  dear 
children, you must be persuaded also that you own nothing 
to those individuals whose blood hatched you out of the 
darkness. Pity, gratitude, love-- not one of these sentiments 
is their due; they who have given you existence have not a 
single right to require them from you; they labor for 
themselves only, let them look after themselves .5 
2). Second. By removing this kind of restrictive instinct and 
emotion, and by denouncing the closest bonds-- the family-- as 
specious, the l ibertine finds himself l imited, checked, at another 
level. one that is far more extensive than the family unit. Thus, 
he must next assert h is mastery over people in general, that is, 
over conventional society as a whole. This project demands the 
cultivated exercise of cruelty on the part of the libertine. He 
must guarantee the effective submission of other ind ividuals, 
precisely to ensure that they remain weak, that they not be a 
threat or limit to his own mastery. 
3). Third. More importantly, perhaps, one's concerns are not 
exclusively preoccupied with individuals . Rather, it is the 
province of customs and manners, for example, morality, which 
binds people together into a more powerful and dangerous 
organisation. Consequently, for the libertine, it is these 
customs which must suffer his attack. Custom or convention 
forms individuals into a group and renders them collectively 
dangerous to the libertine. Also ,  these customs themselves are 
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socially restrictive to the libertine. They continually impose 
taboos and bonds upon the ind ividual, there prohibiting his own 
free action. Thus, Sade repeatedly attacks the customs and 
morality of a people, claiming that they are entirely arbitrary, 
unnatural and unfounded-- in short, they are simply relative 
codes-- relative, as he says, to a patch of  geography, of 
terrain. One particularly personal, i f  not recurring, example he 
cites is to be found at the end of his 'Notes Concerning my 
Detention': 'So long as any French soi l  is left on the globe, it will 
forever be recognisable by the corruption practiced upon it' .6 
4). Fourth . But with the violation of  custom and habit, a new 
basis of social coherency and social justification is revealed, 
one that again severely restricts the libertine, namely, law itself. 
Thus, the libertine is compelled to attack the legitimacy of civil 
law by showing that it, in  turn , is fully arbitrary: that civi l law. just 
as much as manners. customs and habits varies from country to 
country. place to place. time to time. tome to tome. 
To counter the restrictive effects of civil law, Sade shows that 
the law itself is fully unjust and unjustifiable-- that it doesn't merit 
compliance. In consequence, he counsels fraud to overcome the 
unjust law. The civil law, he says, supposedly exists for the weak; 
but the civil contract deprives the weak of what little they do 
have in the first place. Alternatively, and at the same time, it 
deprives the strong the right of  acquiring more. As such. the law is 
contradictory, and benefits no one. As he would claim in Justine. 
the truly intelligent person is  he who ( . . .  ) lashes out against 
the social contract. he violates it as much and as often as 
he is able, full certain that what he will gain from these 
ruptures will always be more important than what he will 
lose if he happens to be a member of the weaker class; for 
such he was when he respected the treaty; by breaking it 
he may become one of the stronger. 7 
5) Fi fth. Society. nonetheless. claims to justi fy the civil order: 
ostensibly, it justifies the state and its laws by calling upon a 
transcendent foundation-- by invoking a deity. by recourse to 
theological argumentation .  for example. by claiming divinely 
ordained rights and principles, divinely sanctioned human laws. 
by claiming equality in the face of God and by the precedent 
of Holy writ. Thus. civil law would typically justify itself by appeal 
to the authority of  Divine Law. 
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The li berti ne, therefore, sets out to deny t he existence of 
God: to disprove the di vi ne, i ndeed, t o  ridi cule i t ,  t o  show the 
pain and sufferi ng t hat religi on in fact cause s the indi vi dual t o  
endure-- and, c ertai nly, this i s  the very axi s of hi s novel, Justine. 
To overcome or to correct t he limitations i mposed by rel i gion, 
Sade appropri ately teaches blasphemy. 8 
But blasphemy is not only a temporary vi ctory, a pyrrhi c 
victory, on the way to complete mastery and freedom, a 
victory gained largely by flight . Blasphemy i s  only tactical stage 
because i f  theology is itself but the product of a f rail human 
psychology, i f  God is only a fict ion of weak minds, then t he 
claims of reli gi on are easily dispensed wit h. Reli gion as t he 
foundation of law, law as the foundation of society' s manners 
and custom s-- all t his can be easily dissipated. One need not 
struggle agai nst mankind' s pettiest fears, because they simply 
reflect and rei nscri be the weakest elements of soci ety at large. 
To seriously wage war with religi ous taboos and beliefs, and to 
remain at thi s  level of  discourse and blasphemy, would be to 
concede the i ssue of mastery. It would be to depend upon t he 
reli gious beli efs of other people-- hardly one' s equals-- t o  
depend on their child-like delusions for one's o wn attempt 
at victory, one' s own liberation. Rather, t he libert ine derives 
pleasure and strength from hi s mastery over society and t heir 
si lly beli efs: the li bert ine hi mself accordingly becomes solitary 
and uni quely soverei gn- - di vi ne.9 
6) . Si xth. To remove himself from all senti mental, fami ly, social, 
ci vi l and reli gi ous rest ricti ons, Sade mak es t he libert ine attain 
equality with nature at large. U p  unti l now, each stage of 
his progress towards the att ai nment of mast ery, hi s path t o  
absolute freedom, had been j ust ified by appealing to nature. 
But at thi s  stage of hi s evolut ion, the libertine now concei ves 
hi mself to be on the same level as nature itself . H e  wi llfully 
embra ces all that exi sts: he pursues all thi ngs, every acti vity, 
every thi ng, and not Just pleasant di versi ons or excesses. H e  
welcomes pai n ,  sufferi ng, j oy, fi lth, happi ness, wealth, abuse, 
degradati on, every act ,  every deli ght , every torture. 1 0  
Sade here reinterprets nature in a way that is  somewhat 
di fferent from the traditi onal vi ew. For Sade, nature is preci sely 
the sum of forces of creation and dest ruction. Indeed, to 
create, one must forci bly dest roy. Thus, for Sade, there is no 
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natural order as such to be maintained, no natural reason, no 
natural purpose, no natural ends. What is natural, then, is quite 
simply, everything that could p ossibly be. As Bishop Butler would 
so succinctly exp ress th is: 'All th at is, is and not another th ing' . 
To wit, nature as partes extra partes, in a p erp etual state of 
motion, of dynamic transformation. Indeed, th is is far from 
th e rationally ordered and p urp osive view of a traditionally 
conceived nature. 
So, with the libertine, th ere is nothi ng more natural than th e 
destructive violation of what was formerly called natural law-­
th e God-given reason and p urp ose that p urp ortedly structured 
th e entire universe and th e constitution of the h uman species. 
By appealing to his newly formulated natural order, Sade 
will h ave sodomy rep lace the sanctified form of p rocreation. 
Likewise, bisexual i ty and h omosexual ity, because they exp ress 
natural urges, are more natural than what was formerly called 
sex by nature: for example, conventional sexuality-- its practice ,  
and the identity of its particip ants. In  keeping with th is new 
found view, contracep tion and onanism disp lace mere birth -­
and abortion and murder serve to transgress wh at religion 
had for so long venerated as ' natural' life. In one of his 
characteristically exculpatory accounts, S ade would equate 
criminality itself with his account of nature, both of th em seen 
as the extension of mech anics: 
The p ri mary and most beauti ful of Nature' s qualit ies i s  
motion, which agitate her at all times, but th is motion is 
simply a p erpetual consequence of crimes; sh e conserves it 
by means of crime only; the p erson wh o most nearly 
resembles her, and therefore th e most perfect being, 
necessarily will be the one wh ose most active agitation will 
become the cause of many crimes. S ince it is p roven th at 
sh e cannot rep roduce without destructions, equilibriu m 
must be p reserved; it can only be p reserved by crimes; 
th erefore, crimes serve Nature; if they serve h er, if she 
demands them, if sh e desires them, can th ey offend her? 
And who else can be offended i f  she i s  not? 1 1  
7) .  Seventh . Yet, for Sade, even this seemingly total 
abandonment of restrictions, this complete overcoming of 
taboo, law, form, identity, order and natural limitation, etc. , 
even th is seems to be inadequate because the libertine would 
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unwittingly become a slave to nature itself, to nature herself. 
Indeed, nature permits-- it encourages, it is identical with-­
every conceivable violation and excess. Thus, nature seems to 
exercise her authority even here, even in the deepest and most 
excessive throes of criminality. And while the natural order so 
conceived might hardly be thought to be at all repressive or 
restrictive, nonetheless, for Sade, even this is felt to be an 
impediment to his concept of a total freedom or sovereignty . 
He therefore feels compelled to overcome nature itself. But 
how can one plausibly do this? How can one overcome or 
transgress nature? Especially, nature as it is conceived by the 
likes of someone l ike Sade?-- for example, according to a 
rather casually conceived E ighteenth century mechanistic 
view. 
Sade seems to present three ways of overcoming nature so 
conceived: thereby, to gain absolute freedom for the libertine: 
a). The first way is by teaching, and by adopting, the cultivated 
practice of apathy. Neither a question of creation nor 
destruction, neither production nor depletion: rather, the 
libertine finally attains a state of rest and passivity-- he 
continually needs whips, chains, implausible devices, greater 
and greater tortures and spectacles to increase his jaded state 
of apathy. In short, the libertine denies nature any kind of 
recognisable or typical activity, by refusing to participate on its 
terms. And at this state, the initial distinction between · real' 
and 'alleged' needs-- or, between natural and conventional-­
becomes abandoned. 
b) . The second approach Sade takes in his attempt to 
transgress nature is to replace it with what could only be 
unnatural-- the life of the imagination. And, for Sade, the 
imagination is the highest faculty, the highest capacity of 
mankind. The libertine acts out of the imagination in order to 
impose what is thoroughly fictive, unnatural, in the place of the 
real and natural. Nature thus becomes recreated in the image 
of the debased and perverted libertine ' s  imagination. · 
c) . As a third strategy, Sade seeks to reverse the very conditions 
of man's natural existence .  No longer shall health inspire 
happiness, but now, continual shock, disruption, and violence .  
If health is also equilibrium, harmony, proper proportion, reason 
and balance, then this shall be overturned and made 
unstable, unbalanced and degenerate by excess of everything, 
by-- as Bataill e would have it-- plethora. 
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8) .  We reach the eighth stage of the Sadean itinerary. In the 
end, we could say that Sade's libertine achieves al l he has set 
out to attain-- that he overcomes all opposition and becomes 
free, unfettered. But the only limitation he cannot overcome is 
death itself. He comes closest to surpassing that most human 
mark of finitude, however, in Juliette, when he says, 
What I should l ike to find is a crime, the effects of which 
would be perpetual, even when I myself do not act, so that 
there would not be a single moment of my l ife, even when I 
were asleep, when I was not the cause of some chaos, a 
chaos of such proportions that it would provoke a general 
d isturbance so formal than even after my death its effects 
would stil l be felt. 1 2  
Also, one can find much the same state purpose in Justine: for 
example, the well known passage where Sade compares one 
of his characters to 
. . .  those perverse writers whose corruption is so dangerous, 
so active, that their single aim is, by causing their appal l ing 
doctrines to be printed, to immortalize the sum of their 
crimes after their own lives are at an end : they themselves 
can do no more, but their accursed writings wil l instigate 
the commission of crimes, and they carry this sweet idea 
with them to their grave. 1 3  
A third instance in Justine, where the l ibertine l iterally  
experiences the del ight of transport in overcoming the 
l imitations of death, is the occasion of the game played by the 
infamous cad Roland, the old game of 'cut-the-cord ' .  In this 
case, the petit mart of jouissance effectively becomes an 
out-of- life experience: 
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Roland is stimulated by a few of his usual caresses; he 
climbs upon the stoo l ,  I put the halter round his neck; he 
tells me he wants me to curse him during the process. I am 
to reproach him with all his l ife' s  horrors, I do so; his dart 
soon rises to menace Heaven, he himself give me the sign 
to remove the stool, I obey; would you believe it Madame? 
Nothing more true than what Roland had conjectured: 
nothing but symptoms of pleasure ornament his 
countenance and at practically the same instance rapid 
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jets of semen spring nigh to the vault. When 'tis all shot out 
without any assistance whatsoever from me, I rush to cut 
him down, he falls, unconscious, but thanks to my 
ministrations he quickly recovers his senses. 1 4  
We recall a striking fact about the Marquis de Sade: he 
was imprisoned for a period of twenty-seven years. We could 
say that the cause for his imprisonment was simply the fact that 
he was certifiably , impossibly mad. These two considerations go 
a long way to explain why he was obsessed with the notions 
of constraint, restriction, limitations and his almost Satanic 
obsession with power. In short , it is perhaps understandable why 
he was so concerned with his own absolute freedom, l iberty or 
mastery. 
Psychopathology and rhetorical hyperbole aside, however-­
and granted . they are difficult to minimize in Sade's case-- his 
itinerary of transgression nonetheless reflected one of the major 
themes of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thought: that 
of autonomy and self-determination. Certainly, autonomy as 
the transformation of the subjected individual, but also, by 
virtue of his participation in the French Revolution, Sade joins 
the modern historical movement of national self-determination, 
which so consciously sought to incarnate these very ideals. 
At once striving for a rigorous personal autonomy, yet 
finding himself bound by the conflicting demands of the 
still-emerging nation state, Sade embodied the often times 
painful contradictions of modernity in his own person : not the 
least of which was his repeated incarceration by the 
revolutionary regime itself, much less his fortuitous liberation 
from its death-sentence by the guillotine (/ 'arret de mort) . 1 5  
To get a clearer perspective on this subject who is the agent 
of transgression, we are again drawn to the nature of the libertine 
as cast by Sade-- particularly in regard to the defining role played 
by his 'otherness' ,  that in relation to which transgressive agency is 
directed. From Fichte through Kojeve, it has become relatively 
commonplace to understand the very interiority of the modern 
subject through its relation to the other. Bataille, for example; 
develops his understanding of 'inner experience' according to 
what he terms the 'principle of continuity' . 1 6  Simply stated, the 
principle of continuity holds that we can describe what any 
individual is or is not , in terms of that individual's continuity 
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with other people (the intersubjective dimension), contin�ity 
with oneself (the constituted ego identity), continuity with the 
prevailing morality, with the prevailing thought of an age, with the 
environment. With those whom one trusts, with what one believes, 
continuity with the ensemble of civil and cultural codes, or-- in 
brief-- continuity with one's place in the world (the domain of 
general acculturation). In each case, we say that one is 
continuous or discontinuous with respect to something else-- with 
respect to society, time past, humankind in general. ideology, 
value, nature and culture. 
Now, we don't usual ly  employ the term 'continuity' when 
we talk like this, but we do use other words for the some kind of 
relation: we say, for example, that someone is ·well-adjusted', 
'at ease', ' integrated', 'normal', 'conventional', that he 'gets 
along' and is well - or poorly- 'adapted', etc. We may also 
say, for example, that we ' identify' wi th something, that we 
'associate' with others, or that we ' relate' to them in some 
fashion. 'Adjust', ' identify', ' integrate', 'associate', ' relate': 
these terms mean that we unify, that we become one, with our 
surrounding world. Such an analysis tends to make us think 
in terms of others, i n  terms of what is outside us. We are 
well -adjusted because we are continuous with what i s  not us. 
What is peculiar in  these cases i s  that to account for the 
specificity of the subject, we seem to have totally abstracted 
from the very uniqueness and individual i ty of ourselves-- from 
what we are, deep down inside. Who is this me which must 
undergo the process of adjustment, identification, integration 
or association in the first place-- and continual ly  thereafter? 
Sade asks the question, and his answer is, nothing but 
energy: sheer, unrestrained, unlimited energy. Energy without 
form, without order, wi thout reasons, excuses or justification. 
Now, the terms Sade uses to describe this energy are several: 
most importantly, they are desire, passion, shock, pleas�re, 
pain, excitation, orgasm, flood etc. Each of these terms is 
unique in that of itself it has no l imits, no specific nature, form or 
identity. When one strips everything away from oneself, all 
conventions, all definitions, codes and restrictions, what results? 
Unrestrained energy that expresses itsel f as action, as desire, as 
passion etc. , and in an infinity of ways. 1 7  Thus, at the very start 
of Philosophy in the Bedroom, the positively divine libertine, 
Mme. de Saint-Ange (Madame Holy Angel), says: 
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I h ave discovered that when it is a question of someone 
like me, born for libertinage, it is useless to th ink of imposing 
limits or restrains upon oneself-- impetuous desires 
immediately sweep th em away. In a word, my dear, I am an 
amphibious creature; I love everyth ing, everyone, whatever 
it is, it amuses me. I sh ould like to combine every species. 18 
H ere, especially , we see th is drive to unite, to combine, to be 
continuous. But th ere is  a significant difference in th is case. 
Mme. de Saint-Ange is not going to combine on th e level 
of them, of the other, of society , morality and religion. 
No sh opkeeper mentality th ere. A real Iron Lady, sh e-- and 
certainly one of th e maj or figures in Sade' s repertory of 
libertines. 
Sh e wants continuity, but on a quite different level-- h er 
own level. Continuity on the level of what is h er own, h erself. 
And, her imperious continuity is centrifugal, not centripetal! 
Wh at is th is level of self for Sade? We have already noted it: 
energy-- a fully consuming passion, desire, pleasure, ecstasy. 
All these terms, which are themselves formless and without 
restriction. all these terms wh ich point to the level of the most 
personal. intense. core sense of self , all these are really 
expressions of wh at we call sexuality, eroticism, life energy as 
primary process, as libido, as power. 
Wh at th e libertine wants, then. is the free fulfillment, th e 
unrestrained exercise of all these desires, these primary drives 
and pulsions. Th us. sexuality is the strongest. the most intense, 
most personal performance of continuity- - to be associated 
with . identified with , integrated with-- anyth ing. U nity or 
continuity, in th is case, is dictated from with in, from the 
intensely personal drives and desires. wh ich furrow and invest 
exteriority with deligh t. Th is comes from within and not, repeat. 
not from without. Th us. th e only th ing truly important to th e 
libertine is h imself. or, equally, h erself-- wh ich explains wh y the 
libertine continually exercises a sovereign and confident 
self-a ssertion, a complete and fulfilling egoism, an unremitting 
subj ectivism wh ich seeks no approval, req uires no consent. and 
tolerates no resistance. All value derives from the unique and 
sovereign libertine: the exterior obj ect stands as noth ing. Selfish , 
vain and totally despotic. 
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At this point in our reflection, there emerges the great 
contradiction-- the contradiction of  all contradictions-- the 
great wall of China: it is the contradiction between the 
individual and the state, the private and public, the self and 
other, the I and the Thou, the subject and the object. In short, it 
is the general contradiction between the me and the non-me-­
which is to say, the you, the they, the them, the it, the system , 
the rules, God, the trap, jail, and the madhouse. We know what 
Sade wants and we know who wins, who will always win. Social 
continuity stands in the way of personal continuity. Social 
continuity requires taboos, restrictions, prohibitions, mores and 
laws. Society, in short, limits the individual' s  very life, his 
freedom to act out of himself. The individual's life thus becomes 
broken, fragmented, made discontinuous by the demands of 
social continuity. Society thereby forces the individual into 
isolation- - into a situation that frustrates his very attempt to be 
autonomous. 
We have already seen how these restrictions and 
prohibitions assume a systematic order for Sade: internal ized 
instincts led to the family; the family led to society; society led 
to morals and manners; morals and manners led to law; laws 
led to theology; theology led to reason; reason to nature. Each 
move in this series was a justification for the previous move, the 
previously attained stage. Thus, society ultimately justifies itself 
by appealing to what is ' natural'. Furthermore, we saw how 
Sade attacked each justification in turn, even to the point of 
upsetting or volatilizing the very notion of nature. Thus. he 
effectively eliminates the source, the cause, the origin of 
these-- to him-- painful taboos. He eliminates the underlying 
reason or justification for any taboo, any restriction or inhibition. 
In short, Sade is perfectly content to get rid of anything that 
stands between the libertine and his own expression of natural 
instincts . that is, . his own so-called ' inverted' or volatilized 
nature-- which is neither rational nor theological. Nature here 
becomes a reflection of the libertine' s  own energy, his own 
passions, desires and destructive cruelty. Simply by reading 
Philosophy in the Bedroom, one could easily divine what would 
become of social continuity-- much less, community-- were 
Sade to implement his stated project. Now, the traditional way 
of defining the individual according to social continuity would 
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be the following (for example, according to an ascending 
order of justification), and this i s  contrasted with Sade's 
position: 
TRADITIONAL V IEW SADE'S VI EW 
1 )  ind ividual 1) individual (libertine) 
2) sentiments 2) X (alleged) 
3) family 3) X (fictional) 
4) society at large 4) society of l ibertines ( jokes) 
5) morals (manners) 5) laws (capricious and few, if any) 
6) laws 6) morals (manners) 
7) theo logy 7) X (blasphemy) 
8) reason 8) X (desire, passion) 
9) nature 9) nature ( inverted, volati lized) 
Nature. then. for Sade-- the base of his whole system, 
becomes the justification for the individual's action-- for h is 
personal continuity, h is  unrestricted fulfi llment of desire, passion 
etc. Natural principles therefore dictate morals and manners: 
on this basis his proposed revolutionary government wol,lld 
institute laws, but laws in accordance with the ways people-­
that is. libertines-- would in  foct behave, laws based on how 
l ibertines do act, not on how people in general should act. 
Thus. society becomes a society of libertines and the individual 
is free to be himself or herself. In other words. everything drops 
out except the libertine himself and an inverted nature. But. 
because nature is i tself either formless or has an infinity of 
forms-- nature. thus, as unprincipled polymorphous perversity-­
it to.o , drops out of the equation. Ultimately, nature is itself 
overcome by the imagination, by exhaustion, excess, apathy 
and art. Thence goes its own agency: likewise, passes any 
imposition of bind or constraint, for example, of law- - of 
legitimation or justification. 
In  the end, the libertine acts out of himself, out of his own 
delight in the senses: the imagination opens an ever-widening 
palate for his tastes, for the progressively intense exercise of his 
drives, eschewing the natural for the infinity of the fictive, 
rendering it-- in turn-- fact. deed . In one sentence of the 
Philosophy in the Bedroom, Sade effectively sums up h is entire 
system: ' Every principle is a judgement. every judgement is the 
outcome of experience, and experience is only acquired by 
the exercise of the senses'. 
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What kind of unity or continuity, then, does the libertine 
achieve in the end? Again, the continuity of uninterrupted 
sexuality, of  a totalizing libidinal cathexis-- once all those taboos 
are removed, ignored, avoided or destroyed. The libertine's art 
is to increase sexual appetite and desire in a vertiginous 
spiral, becoming intensely physical, exteriorized and universally 
imposed-- a kind of physical ex-pression of the formerly private 
drives. And-- formless, beyond all reason-- eroticism would 
never again be the same. This would be a divine madness, 
total transcendence in immanence, akin to the prophetic, 
blasphemous and poetic elements of  the Platonic account in the 
Phaedrus, or to the Dionysian 'witches brew', as N ietzsche 
recounted it in The Birth of Tragedy. The libertine's cathected 
enjoyment would increase 'a thousandfold' in the 'immense 
melting pot' of 'transspeciating' nature. as the Comte de Bressac 
would proclaim. Thereby, the libertine overcomes his isolation: 
through desire's union. Or, through the delirium of madness or 
excess-- whether in intense physicality or, in continually writing 
himself deeper into his own plot of madness. And, in just such a 
plot, everything that stands between the l ibertine and nature, that 
is, between two notions of the inside. everything must collapse: 
laws, morality, sentiments, family, society, reason and religion. All 
these now stand as nothing to his logic of transgression. They all 
have equal value, which is to say, quite arbitrary value-- for the 
now 'divine Marquis' -- precisely because they have no  value of 
themselves in their otherness. As the nefarious Mme. Dubois would 
conclude, 
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One must never appraise values save in terms of our own 
interests. The cessation of the victim's existences is as nothing 
as compared to the continuation of ours, not a mite does it 
matter to us whether any individual is alive or in the grave. ( . . .  ) 
For there is no rational commensuration between what affects 
us and what affects others; the first we sense physically, the 
other only touches us morally, and moral feelings are made. to 
deceive; none but physical sensations are authentic ( . . .  ) thus. 
not only do two hundred louis suffice for three murders, but 
even thirty centimes would have sufficed, for those thirty 
centimes would have procured a satisfaction which, although 
light, must necessarily affect us to a much more lively degree 
than would three men murdered, who are nothing to us. ( . . .  ) A 
little more philosophy in the world would soon restore all to 
order. 19  
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NOTES 
l .  The principle text in question is Bataille's Eroticism, English 
translation, M. Dalwood (London: Calder, 1 962), but 
especially central would be his Inner Experience, English 
translation , L . A. Boldt (Albany: SUNY Press, 1 988), and his 
Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1 927- 1 939, English 
translation . A. Stoekl . C .  Lovitt and D. Leslie (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press , 1 985) . Derrida 's essay ' From a 
Restricted to a General Economy: a Hegelianism Without 
Reserve· .  is to be found in his Writing and Difference, English 
translation, A Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1 978) .  Chapter IX, pp. 251 -257 and Foucault 's text, 'A  
Preface to Transgression' ,  is  to  be  found in  his Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice, English translation, D. Bouchard, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University P ress), Pt. I ,  Ch. l ,  pp.29-52. The 
discussion would also have to include, among many of his 
works. the important ' Sade' essay, by Maurice Blanchot. 
which appears in The Marquis de Sade: Justine, Philosophy 
in the Bedroom, Eugenie de Franval, and Other Writings, 
English translation, R. Seaver and A .  Wainhouse (New York: 
Grove Press. 1 965), pp.37-72, as well as Pierre Klossowski's 
Sade My Neighbour, English translation, A. Lingis, ( Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 1 99 1 ), and his ' Nature as a 
Destructive Principle' . in The Marquis de Sade: The 120 Days 
of Sodom and Other Writings, English translation. A .  
Wainhouse and R.  Seaver (New York: Grove Press , 1 966), 
pp.65-86. 
2. Recall. that for Bataille, the experienced sense of 
transgression came largely from within, that is, from the 
intensified desire provoked and induced by the fearful 
taboo or prohibition. Nonetheless . the taboo or prohibition 
was itself initially imposed from without. 
3. More strongly, the very terms which constitute universality 
itself-- totality, the transcendental . the absolute, law, 
reason and identity-- as an intelligible system or as a system 
of control, these are the terms which Sade is concerned to 
evade, to deconstruct, to dissimulate. 
4. Summa Theologica I, Question 9 1 , article l ;  Question 90, 
article l .  
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5. Sade, Philosophy in the Bedroom, op. cit . .  p. 354 
6. Sade, Justine, op. cit . .  p. 154 
7. Sade, .Justine , p. 494 
8. Here we see one of Sade's recurrent tactics: to contravene 
the universal law or premise by invoking the particular fact. 
The empir ical alone is real. The example of blasphemy 
should bring to mind the occasion for Sade's initial 
imprisonment: the invagination o f  a crucifix and 
confessional wafers he performed upon a young provincial 
girl. The degree of r idicule he draws upon rule governance, 
however, is perhaps nowhere more evident than the 
comminatory set of  rules devised by the 'society of the 
friends of crime' in the One Hundred and Twenty Days of 
Sodom, whereby human actions is 'governed ' or 
' legislated': merely by the number of agents (storytellers. 
prostitutes, vil lains. homosexuals. hags, children) multiplied 
by their collective number of members and or ifices: this 
factor by the production and multiple exchange of their 
respective secretions and emissions. The society 's laws are 
but the temporary coincidence of the libertine's caprice, 
as is membership itself. 
9. The model o f  d ivinity operative in Sade (for example, when 
the narrator identifies himself with it) is also ironic, and 
largely patterned on Descartes' God of the Meditations-­
for whom the divine truths were dependent on the divine 
will. What results from such a position and for God, so 
conceived, is deftly stated by Pierre Bayle, and quoted in 
Leibniz, in his Theodicy. paragraph 180: 'The consequence 
of this doctrine will be, that before God resolved upon 
creating the world he saw nothing better in virtue than in 
vice, and that his ideas did not show him that virtue was 
more worthy of his love than vice. That leaves no distinction 
between natural right and positive right; there will no longer 
be anything unalterable or inevitable in morals. ( . . .  ) (Also) it 
opens the door to the most exaggerated Pyrrhonism: for it 
leads to the assertion that this proposition. three and three 
make six, is only true where and during the time when it 
pleases God: that it is perhaps false in some parts of the 
universe; and that perhaps it will be so among man in the 
coming year'. Leibniz continues his remarks in paragraph 
1 86: 'Through this a rtifice, the eternal verities, which until 
the time of Descartes had been named an object of  the 
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divine understanding, suddenly became an object of God's 
will. Now the acts of  His will are free, therefore God is the free 
cause of  the verities. That is the outcome of the matter. ( . . .  ) 
But if the affirmation of necessary truths were actions of the 
will of the most perfect mind, these actions would be anything 
but free, for there is nothing to choose. ( . . .  ) (And) that was 
preserving only the name of freedom' . In a letter to 
Malebranche, June 1 679, Leibniz states the reason for 
Descartes' ironical characterization of God: ' I  am told that 
Descartes established so well the existence of God and the 
immortality of the soul, I fear that we are deceived by such 
beautiful worlds. For the God or perfect being of Descartes is 
not a God such as one imagines, and as one would wish, that 
is to say, just and wise, doing all things for the good of the 
creatures so far as is possible, but rather he is something 
approaching the God of Spinoza, that is to say, the principle 
of things, and a certain sovereign power called primitive 
Nature, which puts all in action, and does all that can be 
done; which has no will nor understanding, since according 
to Descartes he does not have the good for the object of his 
will, nor the true for the object of his understanding. For he did 
not wish that his God act according to some end, and it is for 
that reason that he excluded from philosophy the quest for 
final causes, under this clever pretext that we are not capable 
of knowing the purpose of God' (my emphases) . 
1 0. Nietzsche would later articulate this state of personal 
dispossession in his doctrine of the 'Dionysian ' attitude in his 
Birth of Tragedy, and in his early essay, 'The Dionysian 
Worldview" .  For an extended discussion of Dionysian 
'dispossession ' ,  cf. D. Allison ,  'Nietzsche Knows No 
Noumenon", in Why Nietzsche Now, Ed. D. O'Hara 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), pp.295-3 10 
1 1 .  Justine, p. 520. 
1 2. Juliette, English translation, A. Wainhouse, (New York: Grove 
Press, 1 968), p. 525. 
13. Justine, p. 6 1 1. 
1 4. Ibid. , pp.687-88. 
15. On July 27th. 1794, Sade was scheduled to be executed. The 
Jacobin bureaucrats, however, had misplaced his prison 
admission papers, so he could not be located by the bailiff 
and be brought to the guillotine by the execution detail. 
Twenty-one of his fellow prisoners were not so fortunate. 
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1 6. G. Bataille, Eroticism, op. cit. Cf. esp. his Introduction, and 
Part One, 'Taboo and Transgression'. 
1 7 . This reduction of the traditionally conceived 'natural' world 
to the domain of the formless, a domain without order, 
parallels the entire Cartesian project, whereby the 
Aristotelian account of nature-- as informed-- is reduced to 
that which, of itself, has no form, and is thereby precisely 
' elemental': the reduction of  all things to the celebrated 
'wax' example in the Meditations . Since wax is an 'element' 
and ordinarily thought of as a ' thing', it has no proper 
' form' at all, save the abstract property of extension. The 
Cartesian project, like Sade's, is to begin from the 
imagination, and to impose an entirely unnatural 
determination upon nature: for Descartes, this ' art' is 
precisely mathematics, his mathesis universa/is. For Sade, it 
is the reduction to the elementally formless, out of which 
desire will multiply its incarnations to infinity, in the ecstatic 
play of transgressive energy. 
1 8 . In Justine, op. cit. , p. 1 87 . 
1 9. Justine, pp. 49 1 , 695 . 
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Reading the Lack of the Body: The Writing of 
the Marqu is de Sade 
Kathy Acker 
I am using this essay to do two things. To read a short passage 
from Philosophy in the Bedroom by the Marquis de Sade . To 
read one of his tales. 
The more that I write my own novels, the more it seems to me 
that to write is to read.  
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